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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050899-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count each of Securities 
Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006) and § 61-
1-21 (2006), Sales by an Unlicensed Agent, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (2006) and § 61-1-21 (2006), and Employing an Unlicensed Agent, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (2006) and § 61-1-21 
(2006), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). * See Addendum A. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court's decision to impose three 36-month terms of 
probation consecutively was an abuse of discretion because it exceeded the sentencing 
limits prescribed by the Utah Legislature. 
1
 No amendments to sections 61-1-1, 61-1-3, or 61-1-21 affect Candedo's appeal. Thus, 
for ease of reference, this brief cites to the current versions of these sections. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). An abuse of discretion 
results when the trial court imposes a sentence that "exceeds the limits prescribed by 
law." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,Tf66, 52 P.3d 1210 (citation omitted); see State v. Law, 
2003 UT App 228,f5, 75 P.3d 923 ("Trial courts abuse their discretion .. . 'if the 
sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law."5 (citation omitted)). Deciding 
this issue, will require statutory interpretation. Matters of "statutory interpretation" are 
"strict questions of law reviewed for correctness and afforded no deference." State v. 
Graham, 2006 UT 43,fl6 n.7, 143 P.3d 268. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 270:35. Moreover, under rule 22(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to consider Candedo's 
challenge of his consecutive terms of probation. Rule 22(e) allows this Court to correct 
an illegal sentence "at any time," which means this Court is permitted to consider the 
legality of Candedo's sentence regardless of whether he preserved the issue below. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(e); see State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241,^28 n.l 1, 31 P.3d 615, affd 
on other grounds, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. Abiding by the parameters of rule 22(e), 
Candedo's appeal addresses only the legality of his sentence, not his underlying guilty 
plea or conviction. See State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76/|[5, 148 P.3d 990 (holding 
"'appellate court may not review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when the 
substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the underlying 
conviction"' (citation omitted) (alteration in original)). 
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Issue 2: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2005), as interpreted by State v. 
Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540, violates substantive due process. 
Standard of Review: Questions concerning the constitutionality of a statute are 
"reviewed] for correctness." State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31,110, 137 P.3d 726; see Jones v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,1|9, 94 P.3d 283 (holding statutory and 
constitutional interpretation "is a task we perform without deference to the trial court's 
determinations" (citation omitted)); State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4,1(8, 84 P.3d 1171. 
Preservation: This Court may reach this issue through rule 22(e), which says this 
"court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any 
time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); see Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at 1J28 n.l 1. As required 
by rule 22(e), Candedo's appeal addresses only the legality of his sentence, not his 
underlying guilty plea or conviction. See Nicholls, 2006 UT 76 at 1(5. 
Alternatively, this Court should consider the issue because exceptional or 
extraordinary circumstances exist. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996); State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,U23, 94 P.3d 186. "To establish 
'extraordinary circumstances/ a defendant must establish that the error is the type of 
'"rare procedural anomal[y]"' that, if left unreviewed, would result in manifest injustice." 
State v. Beck, 2006 UT App 177,1J9, 136 P.3d 1288, cert, granted, 150 P.3d 58 (Utah 
2006); see Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29 at 1(23. For example, in State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), our supreme court "employed the 'exceptional circumstances' 
rubric where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to 
have raised an issue at trial." Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10 (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1130). 
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Similarly, in this case, Wallace was not issued until Candedo's case was on appeal. See 
Wallace, 2006 UT 86 (issued December 19, 2006). Thus, "at the time o f his sentencing, 
Candedo "had no particular need to" argue the probation statute violated substantive due 
process because it had not yet been interpreted to impose no "limitation on the length of 
probation a trial court may impose." Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10; R. 270. Further, preservation 
would add little insight into this Court's analysis because the issue involves a question of 
law that can be easily reviewed for the first time on appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issues on appeal: United States 
Constitution Amendment XIV (Due Process); Utah Constitution Article I, § 7 (Due 
Process); Utah Constitution Article V, § 1 (Separation of Powers); Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-201 (Supp. 2006) (Authorized Sentences); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
(Consecutive Sentences); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2005) (Probation); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (2003) (Definition of Probation). See Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Candedo was charged by information with four counts of securities fraud, a 
second degree felony, one count of securities fraud, a third degree felony, one count of 
sales by an unlicensed agent, a third degree felony, one count of employing an unlicensed 
agent, a third degree felony, and one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second 
degree felony. R. 9-16. Also listed on the information were defendants Nia Cano, 
Bonnie Kunz, and Michael Spencer. R. 7-16. A preliminary hearing was held on March 
10 and 17, 2004. R. 92-93; 266-67. 
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On May 31, 2005, Candedo pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud, a 
second degree felony, one count of sales by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a third 
degree felony, and one count of employing an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a third 
degree felony. R. 207-08; 219; 269:9. In return, the State agreed "to dismiss all 
remaining charges against Mr. Candedo in this case," "not to recommend incarceration," 
and to "recommend probation and if appropriate, a jail term." R. 219. The presentence 
report recommended Candedo "be incarcerated at the Utah State Prison for the terms 
prescribed by law on each count." R. 265. 
On September 12, 2005, Candedo filed Objections and Position of Defendant 
Relating to Presentence Report. R. 226-32. On September 12, 2005, the trial court held a 
sentencing hearing. R. 244; 270. Based on Candedo's motion, the trial court agreed not 
"to consider the letters from the California victims. Frankly, I think I've already rejected 
some of that hearsay." R. 270:6. Following argument, a statement by Candedo, and 
statements for and against Candedo by the victims, the trial court sentenced Candedo. R. 
270. The trial court did "not believe that Mr. Candedo had the same level of 
responsibility as Ms. Cano, although he has responsibility." R. 270:34. "What I think is 
the most fair thing to do with him is to have him serve some time, and then to work for a 
long time paying as much money back as humanly possible." R. 270:34. 
Based on this reasoning, the trial court sentenced Candedo to a term of one to 
fifteen years for the second degree felony, and two terms of zero to five years for each of 
the third degree felonies. R. 245; 270:34-35. The trial court ordered the prison terms to 
run "concurrent with each other." R. 246; 270:35. The trial court then suspended the 
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prison terms and ordered Candedo to serve 365 days in jail with no credit for good time 
served, and placed Candedo on supervised probation for "36 months on each count," 
resulting in a total probationary period of 108 months. R. 246; 270:35. "That's nine 
years because of the amount of money that you've got to pay back." R. 270:35. 
Following imposition of the sentence, defense counsel asked, "Your Honor, may I just 
politely inquire, do you have a power to --?" R. 270:35. Interrupting, the trial court 
responded, "I can give 36 months on each of three felonies that he's convicted of." R. 
270:35; see Addendum C. Candedo filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 247-48. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to his plea agreement, Candedo admitted the following: 
Count 1—Securities Fraud: 
That commencing on or about November 2000, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, in connection with the offer or sale of an 
investment, directly or indirectly to Eric Utley and William May, as a 
party to the offense I made untrue statements of a material fact or I 
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
I made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading; or, I engaged in an act, practice, or course of business 
which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon these persons. 
The value of the property, money or thing obtained exceeded 
$10,000.00, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, a 
second degree felony. 
Count 6—Sales By an Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent: 
That commencing on or about June 2001, in the State of Utah, 
County of Salt Lake, as a party to the offense I willfully engaged in the 
offer or sale of a security without being licensed to transact business in 
the State of Utah , in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-3 and 61-1-
21, a third degree felony. 
Count 7—Employing an Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent: 
That commencing on or about June 2001, in the State of Utah, 
County of Salt Lake, I willfully supervised an agent Bonnie Kunz when 
the agent was not licensed to transact business in the State of Utah, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-l-3(2)(a) and 61-1-21, a third degree 
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felony. 
R. 208-09. 
Defense counsel further explained during the plea hearing: 
Specifically, Mr. Candedo was the sales manager responsible 
for teaching the sales department, if you will, what presentation to 
make. That included Bonnie [Kunz] and . . . Michael Spencer, and he 
himself. Mr. Candedo himself made presentations in Cedar City and 
then Salt Lake City. 
Relating to Count I, Mr. Candedo was present when Nia Cano 
made a presentation, if you will, to Mr. Utley and Mr. May. He didn't 
really—he was not particularly a presenter to these two gentlemen, but 
he was there when Nia Cano made a number of statements that would 
fit exactly into the language of the securities fraud statute that I've just 
talked about. 
Either she was making statements that were untrue or she was 
making statements that were only partially true, and that other 
statements needed to have been made in order for the statements she 
made to not be misleading, and Frank was there. 
Then after that meeting, Mr. Candedo was also involved in 
providing Mr. Utley and May with wiring instructions so that they 
could make investments. So as it relates to being a party to the offense 
and either directly or indirectly participating in the sale, I think he did 
that. So that's Count! 
. . . Count VI, your Honor, factually what happened is that in 
June of 2001 as a party to the offense, Mr. Candedo either sold himself 
what would be considered a security without a license, or he was a 
party to the company called ABC selling securities when people were 
selling securities like Bonnie [Kunz] or Michael Spencer who were not 
licensed. . . . 
Then finally, your Honor, Count VII is that again, as the sales 
manager, he certainly was supervising Bonnie [Kunz] and Michael 
Spencer. The language of the statute is that he was employing an 
unlicensed broker/dealer. What we've added, your Honor, is that he 
was supervising these people, which I think is close enough under the 
statute to being an employer. 
Our position and we will tell you—we are not trying to 
minimize, but our view is that he was an employee himself, not the 
employer so to speak, but he was the supervisor, though. Nonetheless, 
he was the supervisor, so he was supervising people who were 
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unlicensed agents. 
R. 269:5-7. The plea statement also "incorporated herein by reference," the conduct 
described "in the Affidavit of Probable Cause." R. 209; see R. 19-45. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should reverse because the probation statute did not authorize the 
trial court to sentence Candedo to consecutive terms of probation. A trial court abuses its 
discretion in sentencing when it imposes a sentence that exceeds the limits prescribed by 
law. Under the Separation of Powers Clause of the Utah Constitution, only the legislative 
branch may exercise powers that are exclusive to the legislative branch. Although courts 
possess judicial discretion in the sentencing of defendants, the power to fix the 
punishment to be inflicted for a particular crime is vested solely in the legislature. Thus, 
the right of the court to inflict any punishment at all is given it by the Legislature, and 
without some act on the part of the lawmaking power, no such power or duty would be 
vested therein. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive 
terms of probation because the plain language of the Utah Code shows the Legislature 
has not authorized the trial court to impose probationary terms consecutively. 
The Legislature has listed probation and imprisonment as two separate sentencing 
options, and has defined probation as an act of grace to be used in place of imprisonment. 
The probation statute makes no reference to the possibility of running multiple terms of 
probation consecutively. Instead, it allows for modification, extension, or revocation of 
probation, but only upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated 
the conditions of probation. Likewise, the consecutive sentencing statute refers 
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exclusively to imprisonment and provides no guidelines for a court wishing to impose 
consecutive terms of probation to follow. In so doing, this Court should presume the 
Legislature acted purposefully. This is especially true since allowing consecutive terms 
of probation would be inconsistent with the Legislature's stated purpose of probation— 
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation works best when probation runs no longer than necessary to 
determine whether confidence has been misplaced and to give the supervisory regime 
adequate opportunity to be effective. In fact, running terms of probation consecutively 
actually harms the rehabilitation of a defendant because it reinforces his belief that he is 
an outsider whom society distrusts, does not want, and is determined to see fail. 
Thus, because the Legislature has not granted the trial court authority to impose 
consecutive terms of probation, this Court should reverse and remand Candedo's case 
with an order to run Candedo's 36-month terms of probation concurrently. This issue is 
preserved or can be reached through rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Second, this Court should reverse because the probation statute, as interpreted by 
Wallace, violates substantive due process. To satisfy substantive due process, a statute 
must rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. As explained above, the 
Legislature has made its purpose in allowing probation clear—rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitation is a legitimate governmental interest. The probation statute, as interpreted 
by Wallace, however, is not rationally related to achieving rehabilitation. 
As interpreted by Wallace, the probation statute authorizes a trial court to impose a 
probationary term of any length, or to impose probation without specifying any 
termination date at all. As explained above, however, probation should only last as long 
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as necessary to determine whether confidence has been misplaced and to give the 
supervisory regime adequate opportunity to be effective. If probation lasts beyond this 
time, then it becomes counterproductive because it reinforces the defendant's belief that 
he is an outsider whom society distrusts, does not want, and is determined to see fail. In 
fact, it appears from the language of Utah's probation statute that our Legislature 
understood the dangers of long probationary periods and intended to impose a statutory 
limitation on the length of probationary terms. A drafting defect, however, prevented the 
Wallace court from implementing this intent. 
In this case, the trial court imposed 108 months of probation. This probationary 
period is three times as long as the 36-month probationary limit apparently contemplated 
by the Legislature, and far longer than necessary to determine whether Candedo can be 
successfully rehabilitated. As such, it violates substantive due process because it is 
counterproductive to the State's legitimate government interest in rehabilitation. This 
issue can be reached through rule 22(e) or the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE 
PROBATION STATUTE DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE TRIAL 
COURT TO SENTENCE CANDEDO TO CONSECUTIVE 
TERMS OF PROBATION 
This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion. Wright, 893 P.2d at 1120. 
An abuse of discretion results when the trial court imposes a sentence that "exceeds the 
limits prescribed by law." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at 1}66 (citation omitted); see Law, 2003 
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UT App 228 at Tf5 ("Trial courts abuse their discretion . . . cif the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law.'" (citation omitted)). 
The Separation of Powers Clause of the Utah Constitution says, "The powers of 
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial." Utah Const, art. V, § 1 (first clause). The 
first clause is "offended when there is an attempt by one branch to dominate another in 
that other's proper sphere of action." In re Young, 1999 UT 6,^23, 976 P.3d 581 (citation 
omitted). The Separation of Powers Clause also says "no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed 
or permitted." Utah Const, art. V, § 1 (second clause). "[F]or powers or functions to fall 
within the reach of the second clause of article V, section 1, they must be 'so inherently 
legislative, executive or judicial in character that they must be exercised exclusively by 
their respective departments.'" Young, 1999 UT 6 at f 14 (citation omitted). "[W]hen the 
power exercised or the function performed is one that [Utah appellate courts] determine 
is not exclusive to a branch, it is not 'appertaining to' that branch and does not fall within 
the reach of the second clause of article V, section 1." Young, 1999 UT 6 at ^14. 
Under Utah's Separation of Powers Clause, "[legislators alone are charged with 
the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative 
branch." Young, 1999 UT 6 at <[[9 (citations omitted). Specifically, the "power to fix 
punishment to be inflicted for a particular crime" is a power held "sole[ly]" by the 
Legislature. Mutart v. Pratt, 170 P. 67, 68 (Utah 1917). "[C]ourts possess judicial 
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discretion in the sentencing of defendants/5 but "the power to define crimes and fix the 
punishment for those crimes is vested in the legislature." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 
463 (Utah 1988), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Wallace, 2006 UT 
86 at f 9; see State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Utah 1986). In other words, "<[t]he 
right of the court to inflict any punishment at all is given it by the Legislature, and 
without some act on the part of the lawmaking power no such power or duty would be 
vested therein.5" Green, 757 P.2d at 463-64 (quoting Mutart, 170 P. at 68). In this case, 
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive terms of probation because 
the Legislature has not authorized the trial court to impose probation consecutively. 
"When interpreting a statute, this [Cjourt looks first to the statute's plain language 
to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose,55 reading "'the plain language of the 
statute as a whole . . . ,555 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 2003 UT 
App 367,^4, 78 P.3d 995 (citations omitted). The court's purpose when interpreting 
statutory language is "cto render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful,' and . . 
. presume the legislature use[d] each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary 
meaning." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1f52, 63 P.3d 621 (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted). In doing so, the court seeks to "'avoid interpretations that will render 
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.5" Id. (citations omitted). "Only when 
[the court] find[s] ambiguity in the statute's plain language" will it "seek guidance from 
the legislative history and relevant policy considerations.55 Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 
905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). 
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In section 76-3-201, the Legislature lists probation and imprisonment as two 
separate sentencing options available to the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(2)(c)-(d) (Supp. 2006). The Legislature has defined imprisonment, for purposes of 
consecutive sentencing, as being "sentenced and committed to a secure correctional 
facility . . . , the sentence has not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on 
parole, regardless of where the person is located." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(12) 
(2003). Alternatively, the Legislature has defined probation as "an act of grace" the court 
may utilize when it "suspendfs] the imposition or execution of a convicted offender's 
sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (2003). 
Section 77-18-1 provides the court with instructions concerning the imposition of 
probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2005) (probation statute). It says, "On 
a plea of guilty : . . or a conviction of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing 
sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a). It makes no reference to the possibility of running 
multiple terms of probation consecutively. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. Instead, it 
allows for modification, extension, or revocation of probation, but only "upon a hearing 
and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a). 
A separate section, section 76-3-401, provides the court with instructions 
concerning the imposition of consecutive sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(consecutive sentencing statute). This section refers exclusively to imprisonment. See 
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id. It makes no mention of probation and provides the court no authority to impose 
terms of probation consecutively. Id. It also provides no guidelines for a court wishing 
to impose consecutive terms of probation to follow. Li 
This Court should presume the Legislature acted purposefully when it chose to 
distinguish between probation and imprisonment, limited the language of the consecutive 
sentencing statute to imprisonment, and made no mention of running probationary terms 
consecutively in the probation statute. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at €|9 ("Our task is to 
interpret the words used by the legislature, not to correct or revise them."); State v. 
Phipps, 2006 UT App 372, 2006 WL 2627435, *2 (memorandum decision) ("When 
construing the language of a statutory provision, we 'presume that the legislature used 
each word advisedly' and 'will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not 
already there.'" (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 
2001 UT 112,130, 38 P.3d 291)). 
2
 For example, in allowing a court to "impose concurrent or consecutive sentences," the 
consecutive sentencing statute orders the court to indicate such decision "in the order of 
judgment and commitment" for use by the Board of Pardons and Parole. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401(1), (4). It also indicates that "the aggregate maximum" of "consecutive 
sentences" imposed by the court "may not exceed 30 years imprisonment," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(6); and when "determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the 
manner in which they shall be served," it orders the Board of Pardons and Parole to "treat 
the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(8). Next, 
when "sentences are imposed to run concurrently," it explains that "the term that provides 
the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401(9). Finally, it notes that it should only be construed "to limit the length of 
sentences actually served under the commitments," not "to restrict the number or length 
of individual consecutive sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(10). 
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This is consistent with the Legislature's stated purpose of probation—it is an "act 
of grace/5 not punishment. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10). Unlike imprisonment, the 
fundamental purpose of probation is rehabilitation. See Roberts v. United States, 320 
U.S. 264, 272 (1943) (explaining "basic purpose of probation" is "to provide an 
individualized program offering a young or unhardened offender an opportunity to 
rehabilitate himself without institutional confinement under the tutelage of a probation 
official and under the continuing power of the court to impose institutional punishment 
for his original offense in the event that he abuse this opportunity"); State v. Spiers, 361 
P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1961) (noting "rehabilitation of the person on probation is the most 
important objective"); Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554, 557, 559 (Utah 1959) (noting 
"fundamental objective of probation" is "reform and rehabilitation: to give the defendant 
a chance, as the word 'probation5 implies, to prove himself); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 
1041, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (Davis, J., concurring) ("The purposes of probation are 
'reform and rehabilitation' rather than punishment." (citations omitted)). In sum, 
probation is a correctional tool that is intended by the Legislature to deter future crime by 
rehabilitating a defendant and helping him learn to live productively in society. 
Running terms of probation consecutively does not assist in the rehabilitation of a 
defendant. See, e.g., National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final 
Report, § 3105 comment at 282 (1971) (concluding federal criminal code should order 
terms of probation to run concurrently because "either probation will work within a 
relatively short period of time or it will not work at all"); American Bar Association, 
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, §2.3(b)(ii) & Commentary 
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at 67 (limiting length of probation because "'correctional strategy that presently seems to 
hold the greatest promise, based on social science theory and limited research, is that of 
reintegrating the offender into the community'" (citation omitted)). In order to achieve 
the best rehabilitative effects, probation should be no longer than necessary "to determine 
whether confidence has been misplaced and to give the supervisory regime adequate 
opportunity to be effective." Id. at §2.3(b)(ii) & Commentary at 70 (citation omitted). 
In fact, running terms of probation consecutively actually harms the rehabilitation 
of a defendant because it reinforces his belief that he is an outsider whom society 
distrusts, does not want, and is determined to see fail. Cf. American Bar Association, 
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, §2.3(b)(ii) & Commentary 
at 70 (noting open-ended probationary periods tend to "impede rehabilitation by failing to 
provide the offender with a terminal point towards which he can work"). As recognized 
by our supreme court: 
Probation programs are postulated upon an awareness that one 
who has been convicted of a crime in all likelihood had some social 
maladjustment and often a feeling that he is picked on or abused by 
society. Essential to the correction of these things and the bringing 
about of a well-disposed attitude toward society and its laws is the 
allaying of any existing feelings of inferiority or resentment. These 
considerations make it particularly important that his situation of 
limited liberty not be used as a basis to take advantage of or impose 
upon him. They rather argue the advisability of being careful, not 
only to treat him fairly, but in such a manner that he will see the 
fairness of it. 
Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. 
The Legislature appears to have implemented this reasoning. Neither the 
probation statute nor the consecutive sentencing statute authorizes a court to run terms of 
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probation consecutively. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-401, 77-18-1. Instead, the 
probation statute authorizes a single probationary period that can later be modified, 
extended, or revoked, but only if the defendant gives society a reason to distrust him by 
failing to abide by the terms of his probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a). 
The probation statute even accounts for the contingency where, as happened in this 
case, the defendant needs more time than provided by the probationary period in which to 
pay back his restitution. See R. 270:35. The probation statute "provides that when a 
probationer is unable to pay full restitution before the expiration of the probationary term, 
'the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable.'" 
State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92,1(37 n.9, 127 P.3d 1213 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(10)(a)(ii)(A)). Indeed, while restitution is listed by the Legislature as a "condition of 
probation" that may be imposed by the trial court, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(8)(a)(ix), it appears contrary to legislative intent for a trial court to impose an extended 
period of probation for the purpose of enforcing restitution since the Legislature has said 
probation may only be extended upon a finding that the probationer violated the 
conditions of probation, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i), and has enacted the above-
referenced language allowing the trial court keep the defendant on bench probation until 
restitution is paid. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(ii)(A). 
The question of consecutive terms of probation remains relevant after our supreme 
court's decision in Wallace. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^14 (holding Utah Code 
"currently provides no statutory limitation on the length of probation a trial court may 
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impose"); supra at Part II (challenging constitutionality of section 77-18-1, as interpreted 
by Wallace). Unlike one long term of probation, consecutive terms of probation create 
procedural difficulties that, absent guidance from the Legislature, will undermine the 
purposes of probation by creating confusion and unequal treatment of probationers. See 
Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. For example, if a trial court imposes two 36-month terms of 
probation consecutively and the probationer violates his probation during the fortieth 
month, what happens? Can the first term of probation be extended or revoked? Or was 
the first term of probation terminated successfully at the end of thirty-six months? 
Likewise, what happens if the probationer violates his probation during the twentieth 
month? Can his second term of probation be revoked even though he did not violate it 
because it has not begun? Trial courts do not have the authority to make these decisions 
on a case-by-case basis. See Green, 757 P.2d at 463-64. Instead, the Legislature must 
provide guidance as to how to implement consecutive terms of probation (if such is its 
intent) so that consecutive terms of probation can be implemented uniformly. Id. 
Thus, because the Legislature has not granted the trial court authority to impose 
consecutive terms of probation, this Court should reverse and remand Candedo's case 
with an order to run Candedo's 36-month terms of probation concurrently.3 
3
 Even if there is doubt as to the Legislature's intent concerning consecutive terms of 
probation, the rule of lenity says it must be resolved in favor of the defendant. "'When 
there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to 
choose the harsher only when [the Legislature] has spoken in clear and definite 
language.'" Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003) (citation omitted); see 
State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1981) ("[It is] the presupposition of our law to 
resolve doubts in the enforcement of the penal code against the imposition of a harsher 
punishment."). 
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I I THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE 
PROBATION STATUTE, AS INTERPRETED BY WALLACE, 
VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
The Federal Due Process Clause states: "No State shall. . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
Likewise, Utah's Due Process Clause says: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 7. "To satisfy substantive 
due process, a statute must rationally further a legitimate governmental interest." State v. 
Martinez, 2000 UT App 320,f24, 14 P.3d 114 (citation omitted); see Tindley v. Salt Lake 
City School Dist, 2005 UT 30,^|27, 116 P.3d 295 (explaining substantive due process 
seeks "to ensure that legislation is 'rationally related to the accomplishment of some 
legitimate state purpose5" (citation omitted)); Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91,1(30, 103 P.3d 
135 (same). "Under the rational-basis" test, "a statutory classification is constitutional 
unless it has no rational relationship to a legislatively stated purpose or, if not stated, to 
any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). "[T]he presumption requires a court to presume that the 
classification was intended to further the legislative purpose." Id. (citations omitted). 
As explained above, the Legislature has made its purpose in allowing probation 
clear—probation is an "act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or execution 
of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
27-1(10). In other words, the purpose of probation is rehabilitation. See Roberts, 320 
U.S. at 272 (explaining "basic purpose of probation" is "to provide an individualized 
program offering a young or unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself 
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without institutional confinement under the tutelage of a probation official and under the 
continuing power of the court to impose institutional punishment for his original offense 
in the event that he abuse this opportunity"); Spiers, 361 P.2d at 511 (noting 
"rehabilitation of the person on probation is the most important objective"); Baine, 347 
P.2d at 557, 559 (noting "fundamental objective of probation" is "reform and 
rehabilitation: to give the defendant a chance, as the word 'probation' implies, to prove 
himself); Parker, 872 P.2d at 1049 (Davis, J., concurring) ("The purposes of probation 
are 'reform and rehabilitation' rather than punishment." (citations omitted)). 
Rehabilitation is a legitimate governmental interest. It improves probationers' 
lives and prospects; allows families to stay together; allows an offender to work to repay 
his debt to society; saves tax dollars and relieves congestion in the jails and prisons; and 
makes society safer by catching offenders while they are young or unhardened and 
reversing their downward spiral before it is too late. 
The probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, however, is not rationally related 
to achieving rehabilitation. As interpreted by Wallace, the probation statute "does not 
impose any limitation on the length of probationary term that a court may impose." 
Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at | 13 . Thus, because "no other provision . . . limits the term of 
probation," Utah "law currently provides no statutory limitation on the length of 
probation a trial court may impose." Id. at ^14. In other words, as interpreted by 
Wallace, the probation statute authorizes a trial court to impose a probationary term of 
any length, or to impose probation without specifying any end date at all. Id; see Utah 
Code Ann. §77-18-1. 
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As explained above, however, rehabilitation is achieved by "reintegrating the 
offender into the community," American Bar Association, Standards Relating to 
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, §2.3(b)(ii) & Commentary at 67 (citation 
omitted); and will be achieved "within a relatively short period of time," if it will be 
achieved "at all." National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final 
Report, § 3105 comment at 282 (1971). Thus, probation should only last as long as 
necessary "to determine whether confidence has been misplaced and to give the 
supervisory regime adequate opportunity to be effective." American Bar Association, 
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, §2.3(b)(ii) & Commentary 
at 70 (citation omitted). 
If probation lasts beyond this time, then it becomes counterproductive because it 
reinforces the defendant's belief that he is an outsider whom society distrusts, does not 
want, and is determined to see fail. See Baine, 347 P.2d at 559 (probationary programs 
should be designed "not only to treat" a defendant fairly, "but in such a manner that he 
will see the fairness of it"); American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Sentencing 
Alternatives and Procedures, §2.3(b)(ii) & Commentary at 70 (noting open-ended 
probationary periods tend to "impede rehabilitation by failing to provide the offender 
with a terminal point towards which he can work"); supra at Part I. In fact, long 
probationary periods virtually guarantee a defendant will fail, even if he is rehabilitated, 
because he will be required to comply with the many burdensome requirements of 
probation long beyond the time when those requirements have purpose and meaning. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8). This, in turn, could undo the rehabilitation already 
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achieved by making the defendant continue to feel like an outsider, even when he is 
living by society's rules, and could add to the overcrowding of prisons and jails by 
increasing the time during which defendants may be imprisoned for probation violations. 
It appears from the language of Utah's probation statute that our Legislature 
understood the dangers of long probationary periods and intended to impose a statutory 
limitation on the length of probationary terms. The statute says, "Probation may be 
terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation 
of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of 
class B or C misdemeanors or infractions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
(emphasis added). As interpreted by Wallace, the language dictating probationary terms 
of 12 or 36 months is "nearly meaningless, since the court may terminate probation 'at 
any time.'" Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at Tfl3. Its inclusion, however, suggests the Legislature 
intended this language to operate as a statutory limitation on the length of probation a 
trial court may impose, especially since it is included without any reference to "discretion 
of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). This suggestion is further 
strengthened by the fact that the Legislature did not amend the probation statute even 
though Utah courts, prior to Wallace, interpreted the probation statute as imposing a 12 or 
36 month limitation on the length of probation. See State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 
86,T[19, 110 P.3d 149 (holding "court's fourteen and one-half year probation order 
exceeded its statutory authority, which limits probation for any particular class C 
misdemeanor to twelve months" (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (2003))), 
cert, denied. 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1993) (noting "maximum formal probation periods" for misdemeanors and felonies 
"are respectively twelve months and thirty-six months" (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(8)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992))). Indeed, in Wallace, our supreme court concluded the 
construction of the statute that rendered the mandate for probationary terms of 12 or 36 
months "nearly meaningless" was simply a "defect" in drafting, but it could not remedy 
the defect "without inserting meaningful terms that simply are not there." Wallace, 2006 
UT86a t^ l3 . 4 
4
 Many other jurisdictions have adopted provisions that limit the length of probationary 
terms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(1) (1996) (authorizing probationary terms of five 
years for felonies); 18 U.S.C. § 3564(b) (1987) (requiring "multiple terms of probation" 
to "run concurrently with each other"); Ala. Code § 15-22-54(a) (1992) (requiring 
probationary period for felonies not to "exceed five years"); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-
902(a) (2006) (authorizing terms of probation for up to seven years depending on class of 
felony); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-307(b)(l) (West 2006) (requiring periods of probation to 
run concurrently); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-29(d) (West 2005) (requiring 
probationary term for felonies to be "not more than five years"); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-
34.1(g) (2001) ("In no event shall an offender be supervised on probation for more than a 
total of two years for any one offense or series of offenses arising out of the same 
transaction. . ."); 730 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/5-6-2(b) (West 2005) (authorizing 
probation of four years or 30 months, depending on class of felony); Iowa Code Ann. § 
907.7 (West 2003) (requiring length of probation "not to exceed five years" for felony); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-461 l(a)-(c)(8) (2005) (recommending probation length of up to 18 
months depending on class of felony and prohibiting length of probation from exceeding 
five years); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-222(a)(3)(i) (West 2005) (prohibiting 
probationary period from exceeding five years); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.2a(l) 
(West 2006) (same); Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-37 (2006) (same); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
559.016(1) (2005) (same); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.500(1) (2002) (same); N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-20-5(A) (2003) (same); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 2006) (setting 
probation at five years for felonies); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A- 1342(a) (West 1996) 
(prohibiting probation from exceeding five years); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-440 (1992) 
(same); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.96.050 (2002) (requiring parole not to exceed three 
years); W. Va. Code § 62-12-11 (2006) (prohibiting probation from exceeding five 
years); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09(2)(b) (West 2006) (requiring probation for felony not to 
exceed three years). 
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In this case, the trial court imposed 108 months (nine years) of probation. R. 246; 
270:35. This probationary period is three times as long as the 36-month probationary 
limit apparently contemplated by the Legislature, and far longer than necessary to 
determine whether Candedo can be successfully rehabilitated. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-l(10)(a)(i); National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report, 
§ 3105 comment at 282 (1971). Rather than conveying society's desire to see Candedo 
successfully reintegrated into society, such a lengthy probationary term conveys society's 
distrust in Candedo and its desire to see him fail. Such a conveyance is 
counterproductive to the rehabilitative purposes of probation because it feeds "any 
existing feelings of inferiority or resentment" rather than "bringing about [] a well-
disposed attitude toward society and its laws." Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. 
Thus, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) violates substantive due process 
because it does not rationally further the Legislature's stated legitimate interest in 
rehabilitating offenders. As interpreted by Wallace, section 77-18-l(10(a)(i) imposes "no 
statutory limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose," which is actually 
counterproductive to the rehabilitative purposes of probation. 
III. ALTHOUGH PRESERVED IN PART, RULE 22(e) AND 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ALSO ALLOW THIS 
COURT TO REACH CANDEDO'S APPELLATE ISSUES 
This Court should review Candedo's first argument—the probation statute did not 
authorize the trial court to impose terms of probation consecutively—because it is 
properly preserved. When the trial court announced that it was running Candedo's terms 
of probation consecutively, Candedo's trial counsel asked, "Your Honor, may I just 
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politely inquire, do you have a power to-?" R. 270:35. At that point, the trial court 
interrupted and stated its belief that its sentence was lawful. R. 270:35. Once the trial 
court made clear its belief that its sentence was lawful, Candedo's trial counsel was not 
required to continue to object because any further objections would have been futile. See 
State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,^|14, 20 P.3d 265 (holding appellate courts "will not require 
a party to continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has 
rendered a decision on the issue"); Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Crook, 2000 UT App 
217,lfl4, 6 P.3d 1143 (holding no need for party to move to dissolve where "it would 
have been duplicative, costly, and probably futile"); cf State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,^34, 
989 P.2d 52 ("'"[T]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be 
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" (citations omitted)). 
Moreover, rule 22(e) provides this Court with jurisdiction to hear Candedo's 
argument regardless of whether he properly preserved it below. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 
(allowing this Court to "correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time"). Under rule 22(e), this Court will correct an illegal sentence "at 
any time," so long as the appeal deals with the sentence alone and not with the guilty plea 
or underlying conviction. See State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76,^5, 148 P.3d 990 (holding 
"'appellate court may not review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when the 
substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the underlying 
conviction'" (citation omitted)). In keeping with these confines, Candedo challenges 
only the legality of his sentence on appeal. See supra at Part I. 
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Likewise, this Court should review Candedo's second argument—that section 77-
18-1, as interpreted by Wallace, violates substantive due process—pursuant to rule 22(e). 
As before, this argument addresses only the legality of Candedo's sentence; it does not 
address his underlying guilty plea or conviction. See supra at Part II. Accordingly, this 
Court has jurisdiction, under rule 22(e), to hear the issue. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at |28 n.l 1; Nicholls, 2006 UT 76 at «J5. 
Alternatively, this Court should consider Candedo's second issue because 
exceptional or extraordinary circumstances exist. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,f23, 94 P.3d 186. The 
exceptional circumstances doctrine applies to "rare procedural anomalies"; it is used 
sparingly "where [an appellate court's failure] to consider an issue that was not properly 
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 
UT 29 at Tf23; see Beck, 2006 UT App 177 at f9. Both this Court and our supreme court 
consider the exceptional circumstances doctrine as a "'safety device'" which protects 
against manifest injustice. Id. (quoting Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8) (other citations omitted); see 
Beck, 2006 UT App 177 at <|[9. For example, in Lopez, our supreme court "employed the 
'exceptional circumstances' rubric where a change in law or the settled interpretation of 
law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial." Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10 (quoting 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1130). 
Exceptional circumstances require review in this case. Our supreme court's recent 
decision in Wallace was not issued until Candedo's case was on appeal. See Wallace, 
2006 UT 86 (issued December 19, 2006). Wallace interpreted the language of section 
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77-18-1(10) to "not impose any limitation on the length of probationary term that a court 
may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ]fl3. In reaching this decision, our supreme court 
overturned several earlier opinions that interpreted section 77-18-1 to impose a 36-month 
limit on probation. See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at ^19 (holding "court's fourteen 
and one-half year probation order exceeded its statutory authority, which limits probation 
for any particular class C misdemeanor to twelve months5'); Robinson, 860 P.2d at 
982 (noting "maximum formal probation periods" for misdemeanors and felonies "are 
respectively twelve months and thirty-six months"). Thus, "at the time o f his 
sentencing, Candedo "had no particular need to" argue the probation statute violated 
substantive due process because it had not yet been interpreted to impose no "limitation 
on the length of probation a trial court may impose." Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10; R. 270. 
Further, preservation would add little insight into this Court's analysis because the issue 
involves a question of law that can be easily reviewed for the first time on appeal; judicial 
efficiency would be furthered by reaching the issue now because it will impact 
Candedo's case on remand; and justice would be served because section 77-18-1, as 
interpreted by Wallace, is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Candedo respectfully requests this Court to reverse and remand his case to the trial 
court with an order to run his 36-month probationary terms concurrently, or to declare 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i), as interpreted by Wallace, unconstitutional. 
SUBMITTED this 2 2 L day of February, 2007. 
LORI rSEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this "23 day of February, 2007. 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of February, 2007. 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANCISCO ANTONIO CANDEDO, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031900400 FS 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: September 12, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BUGDEN JR, WALTER F 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 3, 1971 
Audio 
Tape Number: 22 Tape Count: 1100 
CHARGES 
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
05/31/2005 Guilty 
• 3rd Degree Felony 
05/31/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 22 COUNT: 110 0 
On record the defense objections to recommendations is heard. 
COUNT: 1123 
Victims testifies. 
COUNT: 1146 
Defense witnesses are heard. 
COUNT: 1154 
Sentencing. 
Case No: 031900400 
Date: Sep 12, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison terms are concurrent with each other. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
No credit for good time. 
Case No: 031900400 
Date: Sep 12, 2005 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 3 
Total Fine: $10000.00 
Total Suspended: $10000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 108 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Defendant is sentenced to 3 6 months on each count. 
Defendant is to pay full restitution jointly and serverally. An 
amount if agreed upon is to be filed with the court within 180 days 
or a hearing will be set. 
Defendant to pay a fine and surcharge of $10,000 which is 
suspended. 
Defendant is to serve 3 65 days jail with no credit for good time. 
Defendant is to surrender passport. 
Dated this V^ day of J>£p*rt , 2 0#-fi"~. 
STEPHEN LpE^RSOD .J 
District l^li^vJudg^r^ 
x.,- ^ 
^-, 
p^ rr<=> 7 flaat-^ 
ADDENDUM B 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection ] the Confederacy and claims not 
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid] 
pomtment ] 5 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
3 [Disqualification to hold office ] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 7 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq 
Utah Constitution Article V, § 1 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
History: Const. 1896. Legislative department, Utah Const, Art 
Cross-References. — Executive depart- VI 
ment, Utah Const, Art VII Municipal powers not delegable, Utah 
Judicial department, Utah Const, Art VIII Const, Art VI, § 28 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2006) 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combinat ion of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Hear ing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity 
for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(hi) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of 
a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(hi) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that 
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for 
the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after 
sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in 
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county 
correctional facility through a contract with the Department of 
Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement 
provided under Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state 
prisoner housed in a county correctional facility as a condition of 
probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8). 
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and 
transportation costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and 
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that 
exceed the negotiated reimbursement rate established under 
Subsection 64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include 
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing 
reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual 
with a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including 
medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the 
court-ordered restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall con-
sider the criteria provided under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through 
(iv). 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the 
defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime, except as provided in Subsection 
(8). 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
[8) (a) The defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in 
prison if the trier of fact finds that: 
(i) during the commission of any of the following offenses the 
defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child: 
(A) Section 76-5-301.1, child kidnapping; 
(B) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child; 
(C) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; or 
(Dj Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; or 
(ii) at the time of the commission of any of the offenses in Subsec-
tions (8)(aXi)(A) through (D), the defendant had been previously 
convicted of: 
(A) Section 76-5-402, rape; 
(B) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child; 
fC) Section 76-5-402.2, object rape; 
(D) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; 
(E) Subsection 76-5-403(2), forcible sodomy; 
(F) Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; 
(G) Section 76-5-404, forcible sexual abuse; 
(H) Section 76-5-404.1, sexual abuse of a child and aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child; 
(I) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(J) any offense in any other state or federal jurisdiction which 
constitutes or would constitute a crime in Subsections (8)(a)(ii)(A) 
through (I); or 
(K) the attempt to commit any of the offenses in Subsections 
(SXaXiiXA) through (J), 
(b) This Subsection (8) takes precedence over any conflicting provision 
of law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 33, § 19; 
1995, ch. Ill, § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, 
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 149, 
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15; 2001, ch. 209, § 1; 
2002, ch. 35, § 4; 2003, ch. 280, § 1; 2006, ch. 
208, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2006 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2006, added "except as 
provided in Subsection (8)" to Subsection (7)(a) 
and rewrote Subsection (8), expanding the list 
of offenses and adding citations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consec-
utively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7J The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(aJ applies, determining the effect 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L. added "When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) 
1973, ch, 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; applies" at the beginning of Subsection (8); and 
1989, ch. 181, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 21; 1995, made stylistic changes. 
ch. 139, § 1; 1997, ch. 283, § 1; 1999, ch. 275, The 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002. 
§ 1; 2002, ch. 129, § 1. divided former Subsection (1) into Subsections 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- (1) and (2); in Subsection (1) added the second 
ment, effective May 3,1999, subdivided Subsec- sentence and added Subsections (l)(a) and 
tion (6), added Subsection (6)(b)(ii), and made (1Kb); deleted former Subsection (4) and added 
related changes; substituted tvof the defendant's the language to Subsection (2); deleted "has 
initial sentence" for "of sentence for any one or reason to believe that the later offense occurred 
more of them" in Subsection (7j(b); added "and while the person was imprisoned or on parole 
the conduct giving rise to the present offense for the earlier offense" following "Board of Par-
did not occur after his initial sentencing by any dons and Parole" in Subsection (4); and made 
other court" at the end of Subsection (7)(c); related and stylistic changes. 
Utah Code Arm. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2005) 
77-18-1. Suspension oi sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standard? — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty oi no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea m abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas m Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may. after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
U) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for sendees; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety'; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any 
treatment program in which the defendant is currently participating, 
if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which ma}' include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viiij pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(ij complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shaft collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-2011, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection 
(hi) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(iij The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(hi) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
ie Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) t reatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for t reatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) tha t a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider, 
(e; The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (2003) 
77-27-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(2) "Commission" means the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile 
Justice. 
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment 
after conviction. 
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(5) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run. 
(6) "Family" means persons related to the victim as a spouse, child, 
sibling, parent, or grandparent, or the victim's legal guardian. 
(7) "Panel" means members of the board assigned by the chairperson to 
a particular case. 
(8) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting a 
person from punishment for a crime. 
(9) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions 
which, if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, enables the parolee to 
obtain a termination of his sentence. 
(10) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposi-
tion or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed 
conditions. 
(11) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution 
of the sentence. 
(12) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging 
from parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the 
expiration of the sentence. 
(13) "Victim" means: 
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or 
class A misdemeanor offense, and regarding which offense a hearing is 
held under this chapter; or 
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the 
offense for which a hearing is held under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-1, enacted by L. prieves, Utah Const., Art. VII, § 12. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 198, § 6; 1988, ch. Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Jus-
172, § 1; 1990, ch. 195, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 31; tice, § 63-25a-101 et seq. 
1996, ch. 100, § 3. Termination or discharge of parolee from 
Cross-References. — Board of Pardons,
 sentence, § 76-3-202. 
governor's power to grant respites and re-
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1 sorry about that or not. I just decided to stay, and here we are 
2 now. 
3 THE COURT: Did you get a paycheck the whole time you 
4 were working? 
5 MR. CANDEDO: No, actually the last four months I 
6 didn't. 
7 MR. BUGDEN: Were you ever paid a commission or bonuses? 
8 MR. CANDEDO: No, I was not. 
9 MR. BUGDEN: You were just salary? 
10 MR. CANDEDO: I was salary. 
11 THE COURT: What was your salary? 
12 MR. CANDEDO: It ended being 6500 a month, which is 
13 about -- a little bit more than I was making in Mexico before I 
14 moved here. In Mexico I was making $5,000 a month. I was a 
15 sales manager for a company (inaudible) over there. 
16 MR. BUGDEN: I think that's what we have to say. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I have reviewed a great 
18 deal of information on this, and I do not believe that Mr. 
19 Candedo had the same level of responsibility as Ms. Cano, 
20 although he has responsibility. 
21 What I think is the most fair thing to do with him is to 
22 have him serve some time, and then to work for a long time paying 
23 as much money back as humanly possible. 
24 I'm going to sentence him to one to five on the 
25 securities fraud — one to fifteen, excuse me, and zero to five 
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1 on the sales by an unlicensed broker and employing an unlicensed 
2 broker — concurrent sentences. 
3 I'm going to suspend -- I'm also going to fine him 
4 $10,000 plus surcharge. I'm going to suspend the prison and the 
5 fine. I'm going to order him to serve 365 days in Salt Lake 
6 County jail and no credit for good time, no — he could be 
7 eligible for work release or ankle monitor, depending on the 
8 jail's standards for that. 
9 He is ordered to pay full restitution jointly and 
10 severally. I'm going to give the State 180 days to reach an 
11 agreement on the amount of restitution or to request a hearing 
12 where we will determine the amount of restitution. 
13 Surrender the passports. All the normal conditions of 
14 probation, which will be for 108 months. That's 36 months on 
15 each of the counts. That's nine years because of the amount of 
16 money that you've got to pay back. 
17 No contact with Ms. Cano or any other defendant in this 
18 case. Any questions? 
19 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, may I just politely inquire, do 
2 0 you have a power to — 
21 THE COURT: I can give 36 months on each of three 
22 felonies that he's convicted of. 
23 MR. BUGDEN: Okay. 
2 4 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . Thank you . 
2 5 ( H e a r i n g conc luded) 
